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     Introduction
    The first international african war is going on. From august 
1998 on 2.5 million people have been killed directly or indirectly in this 
media-silent war 1, this is almost one tenth of all ‘casualties’ incurred by 
the Soviet Union during the second world war. A first  important but partial 
explanation is the change within the world-system after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. I.Wallerstein wrote immediately after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall 2   that with the end of the cold war violence and international warfare 
would change in nature because “The emperor (the US or capitalist he-
gemony) stood naked after he lost his figleaf (of the communist countries)”. 
The end of the east-west competition would open new arena’s of threats to 
peace and in his almost profetic analysis he predicted that violence and new 
conflicts would rather increase because underdevelopment and regress could 
not anymore be imputed to the wrong policies.
  However since the same international environment (the so-called globali-
sation) leads to very different outcomes in this world-system , the geo-politi-
cal explanation should be complemented by other factors. Why do most of 
the violent conflicts occur in Africa where also economic regression is most 
prominently going on ? We shall explore some of the recent and influential 
theories in the second part of our paper. 
  In the third and last part of the paper, I will focus more specifically on 
one of the once key-peripheral countries of the african continent.: DRCongo. 
More specifically, we’ll tackle some questions concerning the first interna-
tional african war. Is this war the product of the new geo-political role of 
Arica in the world-system? Translating the Huntington thesis on the “Clash 
of Civilisations” that means that the unconditional help for the invading 
countries Uganda and Rwanda by the US is nothing else than reinforcing the 
regional agents of US-hegemony against the increasing influence of Islam 
fundamentalism (Sudan). Or should this war be seen as nothing else than a 
second scramble for Africa’s wealth,  reproducing the old good world impe-
rialism thesis? We’ll see that history never reproduces itself but is continu-
ally old and new producing new and unforeseen realities.
1 INTERNATIONAL RESCUE 
COMMITTEE, Washington D.C., 
may 2001.
2 I.WALLERSTEIN, Elegy and 
Requiem for the ideology of 
national development,F.Braudel 
Center, paper 1989, New York 
University at Binghampton.77
1    The bright future and the gloomy figures
    There is an african saying or proverb which is particularly suit-
able to describe the fate of a continent in the capitalist world-system before 
and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. “When two elephants fight each other it 
is the grass that suffer” and one could paraphrase the saying to fit the post 
coldwar era as follows: “and when two elephants make love it is again the 
grass that suffers”.
  We know that structural positions in the world-system are determined by 
positions of hegemony,  dominance and dependency and that these posi-
tions do determine in part the “path dependency”, to use the vocabulary of 
the now fashionable school of institutional economics, of a country. The 
theoretical problem and weakness of the world-system paradigm is however 
to analyse , understand and predict change and diversity between countries. 
Indeed the whole school of dependency and world-systems approach is very 
much penetrated by the idea that the structural position is determinant which 
leaves very little room for change and especially underestimate the way the 
local and the global interact with more autonomy and capacity to influence 
at the local level than is sometimes believed 3. The interaction of nationals, 
local powergroups, traditional bonds and cultural heritage with the external 
environment can produce substantial differences without which we could not 
take into account or understand, the rise of certain countries and decline of 
others in the world-system. That this interaction does not give way to pseudo 
racist explanations,  by explaining the rise of asian countries by eg a better 
cultural fit to the globalisation process,  can easily be demonstrated by the 
fact that  differences within the same cultural horizon can be bigger than 
between different “civilisations”. The performances e.g of African countries 
like Botswana and Mauritius with a growth per capita of  7% and multiparty-
ism contrast enormously with the general tendency of decline in other afri-
can countries and perform much better than certain asian or latin-american 
countries. We therefore very much subscribe the sentence of J .F.Bayart that 
“Africans here have been active agents in the mise en dépendance of their 
societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining in it” 4. This sen-
tence means that of course african elites and powerful individuals can not by 
themselves change their peripheral position but that within this context they 
were as much an actor influencing their destinies and historical trajectories 
by “joining” or “opposing” dependency than were other dominant actors.
  Certainly the fall of the Berlin Wall has altered fundamentally the matrix 
of action for the players on the african continent. The combination of, the 
debt-problem , the structural weak position of Africa in the world system and 
the end of the cold war plunged Africa in a deep crisis that has been reflected 
in the thesis of Afro-pessimism and the thesis of the so-called marginalisa-
tion of the continent. 
  That the crisis is deep and that the structural position of Africa in the 
world economy is weak is beyond discussion. Just a few data. The income 
 3 A.G.FRANK, Reorient : 
Global economy in the asian 
age ( Uinv.of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1998
 4 J.F.BAYART, The state in 
Africa. The politics of the Belly, 
Longman, Harlow,1993, p218 9
per capita has decreased with one to two % since the end of the seventies. 
Thirty five years after decolonisation the income of SSA was 20 %lower. 
At independence Sudan had the same income per head as South Korea. The 
Korean income per head is now 15 times higher than that of Sudan. These 
tendencies find its corrollary in the international position of SSA. The total 
value of the exports of Sub-Saharan Africa with 540 million inhabitants  to 
the rest of the world equals that of Singapore with three million inhabitants. 
Africa ‘s share of world-exports declined from 3% in the sixties to 1.5% in 
the beginning of the nineties. The continent has a regional production that 
equals that of Belgium with ten million inhabitants. Total foreign investment 
in  SSA fell dramatically in the eighties and beginning of the nineties and 
were redirected towards asian destinies. There costs were half that of Africa 
and profits on foreign direct investment nine times  higher while property 
rights were rspected. This deep crisis was also reflected in other non-eco-
nomic data. Most of the world refugees are to be found in Africa and aids 
and other epidemia seem to be more prevalent in these crisis-ridden environ-
ment.
  The international response to that crisis and possible instability has been 
more rhetoric than real up to now. Consider and contrast these realities with 
the speech of the Clinton adminsitration launched at Denver for the 
G-7group and repeated at the Afro-American summit in Harare in 1997 
“…but there  really is a dynamic new Africa out there…Since 1990, the 
number of democracies in Sub-Sahara Africa has more than quadrupled. 
Now more than half the region’ 48 states have freely chosen their leaders. 
Many are embracing economic reform, opening markets, privatising… 
Growth has more thantripled since 1990. The economies in such countries 
as Senegal, Mozambique, Côte d’Ivoire are expanding at rates up to 7% a 
year. Ethiopia was not long ago gripped by famine; it grew by 12% last year. 
Uganda, once a byword for tragedy has become a magnet for investment; it 
grew by almost 10% last year’ 5” 
  The new discourse and international policy on Africa is clear; the so 
called Washington consensus consisting in the triad of economic reform 
(structural adjustment), opening up of markets and privatisation and lastly 
by promoting democracy is seen as the remedy for the crisis and countering 
instability in the region. This new discourse on Africa does not reflect the 
reality. Indeed  we have had more violence in the nineties - Angola, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Tchad, congo Brazzaville, the genocide in 
Rwanda and the first international african war breaking out one year after the 
discourse of the bright future for Africa - than before. There  are however 
two fundamental reasons why this policy is not leading to more peace 
and prosperity. The first is that the Washington consensus policy is not 
complemented by sufficient concessionary financial flows and second that 
the policy underestimates the consequences of the post-cold war changes 
on the behaviour of african elites. The first reason is easily understandable. 
Since the weak structural position of Africa in world trade it is very improb-
able that this continent with low value-added activities will gain sufficiently 
5 USEMBASSY, “Clinton unveils 
new partnershipon african trade” 
june 30th19978 9
by opening up their markets, it will rather weaken their balance of payments 
position. Moreover since states are weak or collapsing and markets very 
imperfect direct investment will not be sufficiently attracted. Therefore if the 
crisis has to be softened in Africa more concessionary financial flows will 
be necessary. If one looks to what the US was engaging in  that region (ap-
prox.1 billion $ compared to the 3 billion $flowing to Israel) under the Clin-
ton administration and that the Bush adminsitration is not likely to increase 
that amount , then the future of the “new Africa” seems much less bright. In 
order to understand the second fundamental flaw in the Washington consen-
sus policy we turn to the second part of our paper.
2    Opposing or complemantary theoretical explanations ?
    Two facts have undermined the idea that countries undergo 
passively the globalisation process and are unable to alter their structural 
position in the world-system. First since the same causes must produce 
the same results  how does one explain the different results between coun-
tries all undergoing the effects of globalisation. That is only possible if the 
articulation between internal and external factors is very different meaning 
that internal (f)actors condition also outcomes. Second, since ther are huge 
differences between african countries in terms of  economic and governance 
performances, then clearly one should explore the specifics of the african 
crisis in terms of internal conditions. So the pendulum in explaining african’s 
underdevelopment has swung since the seventies and eighties from an expla-
nation in terms of dependency to an explanation looking for the causes much 
more in a national and cultural context. Let’s explore some of the influential 
explanations of the african crisis.
 
2.1     The economy of affection thesis
    The fundamental causes of the economic crisis in sub-Sahara 
Africa is in my opinion first described in G. HYDEN’s work “No Shortcuts 
to Progress”, published in 1984. In figure 1 the transition or interaction of a 
traditional society and a modern society is called “economy of affection”.  
The economy of affection points to allocation (french: affection) of time and 
scarce resources by a network of “support communications and interaction 
among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or 
other affinities... Because such co-operation is not an inherent and permanent 
part of the production system, it tends to be ad hoc and informal rather than 
regular and formalized. These are ‘invisible organisations’ which tend to 
be too readily forgotten in the development debate, yet they constitute both 
opportunities and constraints for efforts to change the African societies” 
(HYDEN, p. 8,9).10 11
Chart 1: Economy of Affection
  The economy of affection is certainly most extensive in the rural society 
but stretches out to the apex of society. What in the west is often perceived 
as corruption can be the normal functioning of the economy of affection, e.g. 
a well paid civil servant has the responsability for different brothers, sisters 
and nephews to give them hospitality and help them to finance their stu-
dies or look for a job. He might also at a certain moment divert money and 
resources from a project to some family obligations. In the first example 
resources are mobilized for development in the second however resources 
are diverted and damaging the normal functioning of a state or the market.   
There are a lot of examples where the economy of affection is mobilizing 
scarce resources in a very efficient way for development (small saving and 
investment groups based on kin and neighbourship relations that cannot be 
served by formal banking institutions investment in human capital etc.).  
Examples of the contrary are also well known (e.g. almost one half of all for-
mal co-operatives going virtually bankrupt in Zaïre by diversion of funds).
  If the formal economy and the state are not very performant, people are 
naturally  inclined to drawback in the traditional networks that they know 
better and give them more security thereby undermining further the weak 
structures of state and market.
  This perverse spiral deepens the crisis and can virtually block the formal 
economy and the institutions (health and education services, public utilities 
etc) up to a point where the state is almost unexistent. Of course the eco-
nomy of affection or the informal sector absorbs part of the crisis and leads 
to creative popular responses but has also very substantial drawbacks in the 
long run on attitudes and development. If schoolteachers charge private fees 
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chandise and medical staff selling drugs and universities deliver valueless 
diploma’s, then everybody is court-circuiting the already weak institutions. 
When these practices are also found on a huge scale in the top of a nation 
where the president (e.g.Mobutu) himself is believed to have built up a pri-
vate fortune of about 5 billion $ (Time-magazine) or 70 % of the whole debt 
of the country, then public morality is a joke. The “Mal Zaïrois (Congolais)” 
or Zaïrian sickness as it is called is mirrored in the Zaïrian (Congolese) 
languages where you have a few hundreds of expressions for the word bribe.
  Once the negative aspects of the economy of affection reach the apex of 
society, it spirals down the whole society and saps the real foundations and 
institutions of modern society. You do not get back a traditional society but 
only a perversion of it since the past can never be reconstructed.
  In the words of the author then , there are ‘no shortcuts to progress’. 
Africa is pre-capitalist and cannot escape “the brutal but necessary role of 
capitalism”. The bankruptcy of economic statism so prevalent in Africa 
needs to give way for the construction of a capitalist class that will broaden 
the material base. This echo of the discussion between K.Marx and Vera 
Sassoulitch on the possibility of skipping “the brutal phase of capitalism” 
one century later, has been very influential. The so-called new african leaders 
backed by the US (Museveni of Uganda and P.Kagame of Rwanda) have 
been influenced by Hyden .and embrace the new credo that foreign invest-
ment, economic reform, liberalisation and economic growth is essential to 
overcome the structural african crisis. That they have their own agenda’s 
will be fully clear in the last part of the paper. Let us now focus on the more 
recent theory that has been embraced by the World Bank in order to explain 
differences in economic, government and other institutional differences 
between countries. 
2.2    The social capital approach
    Whereas it is now almost universally accepted that markets are 
a good device in delivering private goods and services there is a whole area 
where markets and capitalism do not have the answer. The discussion is not 
anymore market or state but what can a market do and what it cannot, the 
question is not if there should be state intervention but what is the quality 
of that intervention and how do you explain the enormous divergence in 
real markets and real states? It is in that discussion that a new framework of 
understanding has been formulated that we would call “new institutional-
ism” developed at the crossroads of different human sciences. An important 
contribution to this debate is the concept of social capital.
  Social capital as a stock of values and social networks, helps people to 
cooperate and trust each other in order to overcome dilemmas of collective 
action (prisoner dilemmas, free-rider behaviour, tragedy of the commons, 
etc) that would be impossible if behaviour was based on narrow “pursuit of 
self interest”. 12 13
  The theory of dilemmas of collective action developed largely from 
within the science of economics and more particularly “game theory” show 
how rational behaviour in the context of distrust can lead to the worst case 
scenario. The best known dilemma is the prisoner dilemma where two 
detainees have to denounce the other in order to be free. Without cooperation 
and trust they both denounce each other and consequently get the heaviest 
penalty. However if both do not denounce each other proof of guilt can not 
be given, the penalty therefore less than if denounced.
   
  The best known examples where given by Ostrom in what is known as 
“the tragedy of the commons”. Deforestation, desertification, overgrazing of 
the common fields, depleting of fishing grounds by the use of fine meshed 
nets, queing on motorways, airpollution etc are all fields  explained by 
dilemmas of collective action.
  There are two solutions to the problem of dilemma’s of collective action . 
The first is “third party enforcement “. The other is a soft solution of volun-
tary cooperation which will depend on “social capital”.
  Third party enforcement is necessary if parties do not voluntarily cooper-
ate because of opportunism, lack of trust, pursuit of short sighted self-
interest etc. Since people are not saints and universal altruism an unatainable 
ideal how do you deal with those dilemmas. A third party by law and coer-
cion can sanction the parties if do not respect the rules. The problem with 
third party enforcment is that it is very costly but more fundamentally, how 
can you be sure that the enforcers, the state, those in power, act for the com-
mon good and do not “free ride” on the back of citisens efforts and 
tax-money, with other words how do you eliminate corruption and enforce 
“effective and responsive government”?
  A lot of the expenses of third party enforcment can be set aside if there 
is voluntary cooperation. That is possible in a society that has inherited a 
substantial stock of social capital, in the form of normsof reciprocity and 
networks of civic engagement. Social capital refers here to features of social 
organisations, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions. (Coleman, 1990, 
p302)12 13
Features of social capital:
1.  It is capital , but unlike physical capital it increases with use 
2.  it is social and therefore is a public good that is indivisible and difficult to  
  produce in an intentional amount
If you would like to chart it:
  norms of
  reciprocity
          economic
  welfare  stock of  cooperation enhancing   
                              social capital      institutional
          performance
 
  networks of
  civic engagement
   
This theory of social capital popularised by R.Putnam in his seminal work on 
Italy 6 has been thoroughly criticised on different grounds:
•   the causality between all kinds of social groups and economic perform 
  ance seems to be more of a hocus-pocus forgetting the whole area of    
  capital accumulation 
•  certain social groups are detrimental for democracy and the production of  
  public trust
•  can you produce or engineer social capital if its production  is so “path  
  dependent”?
•  the role  of the state has been underestimated and that of the civil society  
  overemphasized.
  All these points have been discussed in order to improve the explanatory 
character of the theory. I will only mention the improvement in terms of the 
articulation between the quality of the state and the different combinations 
with development enhancing social capital (cross-cutting ties ) and develop-
ment hindering social capital.
This is depicted in chart 3.
6 R.PUTNAM, Making 
Democracy Work, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 199314 15
 
 
  Whereas traditional dependency and world systems approaches overem-
phasised the role of the dominant and hegemonic core countries, the new 
approaches sin by the almost total ommission of external factors in their 
analysis. More comprehensive and enlighting are some recent publications 
by R.Bates and J.F.Bayart 7.
2.3     Bates’ political economy of development and Bayarts’ 
    criminalisation of the state and extraversion thesis
    In his most recent work R.Bates, a well known economic 
scholar on Africa, writes that the study of the political economy of develop-
ment is the study of prosperity and violence . The Great Transformation of 
society (to use the words of K.Polanyi) depends critically on economic and 
political development. 
  ‘Economic development occurs when persons form capital, making 
present sacrifices in order to reap future gains. It occurs when they form 
economic organisations that productively combine…such that the product of 
the “whole” - be it a city or a firm- exceeds the sum of what can be produced 
by the parts. When people invest and combine, the city then displaces the 
village, the firm displaces the farm…prosperous societies emerge from 
7 R.BATES, Prosperity and 
Violence : The political economy 
of Development, Norton pub.Cy, 
2001. And J.F.BAYART, Africa 
in the World : A history of 
extraversion, in African Affairs, 
2000 p.217-267
Chart 3: The evolution of the state and social Capital in some african countries
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the great Transformation. Political development occurs when people 
domesticate violence, transforming coercion from a means of predation into 
a productive resource. Coercion becomes productive when it is employed 
not to seize or to destroy wealth, but rather to safeguard and promote its 
creation. The political roots of development productively join with the 
economic when specialists in violence realize that they can best survive and 
prevail by promoting the prosperity of their economic base.’ (Bates 2001, 
p.101-102)
  For Bates the prevalence of violence and predation in the political sphere 
and the regression in the economic arena are linked. But not as an intrinsic 
feature of peoples or cultures but very much linked with the history of  the 
worldsystem after the second world war. Economic crisis and violence oc-
curred.
  ‘…where the state system that prevailed after world war II provided 
sufficient safeguards that political elites did not tend to treat economic 
policy-making as a matter of political survival. …Lacking the spur of the risk 
of survival (because during  the east-west geo-political competition,  elites 
were flooded with financial aid flows = our addition) , in most developing 
countries, those with power confronted few incentives to render coercion 
economically productive. …Variations in the incentives faced internationally 
thus help to account for differences in the behaviour of states over time and, 
within the modern era, over place’ (Bates,p.104)
  This explanation by Bates accounts certainly for a more complete picture 
of  the crisis or the so called marginalisation of Africa. In order to weave 
cloth and create differences you need a different pattern of warp and weft.  
In order to explain differences between peripheral countries  you need  the 
articulation of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors.  What Bates does not 
explain is why  violence and economic regress seem to be more prevalent 
and on a larger scale in Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
  One explanation is given by Wallerstein. Experiences  of regress, 
poverty and social exclusion will be part and parcel of the world-system and 
people will look for a scapegoat and salvation. Since globalisation will fuel 
unattainable dreams and frustration for many  it seems possible that modern-
isation is looked upon as the cause of their frustration and turn to the lost 
paradise of the traditional values. If these frustrations and aspirations are 
mobilised it can lead to internal violence and  wars. 
  Bayart adds onother interesting hypothesis more specifically for the 
evolution of the state system in Africa after the cold war.  The international 
scene has dramatically altered the ways elites in Africa respond to that new 
phase in dependency. The introduction of the Washington Consensus – 
economic and political reform, liberalisation  and  privatisation –after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall has impeded for many regimes the easy access for african 
elites to financial funds. Since the transition from predation to economic 16 17
productive taxation is impossible (argument against Bates’analysis)in most 
countries, because of the weak state and market structures; war and  the 
criminalisation of the state are the new strategies of extraversion in order to  
secure vested interests . In an exceptional case the transition to a succesful 
democracy, where the elites have been able to ‘… productively join with 
the economic when they as specialists in violence realize that they can 
best survive and prevail by promoting the prosperity of their economic 
base’ (Bates– can be realised . This insight is in sharp contadiction with 
the official discourse on ‘the bright future of africa’heralded by the Clinton 
administration. Our  case study on the first international african war in 
DRCongo seems at first sight to confirm Bayarts’ thesis. 
3    The case of the DRCongo and  the first international  
    african war
3.1     A  short historical digression
    Congo got its political independence june 30th of 1960. The 
colonisation has been a brief period in the history of a territory populated by 
some 450 different ethnic groups with as many languages.  
  A first period of colonisation from 1875 to 1908 was characterised by 
brutal predation and violent coercion on the population by the Belgian King,  
Leopold II. He was able to convince all hegemonic powers at the 1885 
Berlin Conference to grant this huge country, 80 times bigger than Belgium, 
the status of ‘Etat indépendent du Congo’. This was a private territory under 
the exclusive governance of the King and on condition that commerce 
would be free for all hegemonic states and slavery abolished. Further plans 
of developing infrastructure, policing the territory and investment in the 
exploitation and processing of raw materials however, drove up the costs of 
the empire. This led the King to hand over the territory to the Belgian state, 
after leaving the vault of the “Etat Indépendant du Congo” empty. 
  The territory became officially a belgian colony in 1908. This short 
period was an apparent break with african civilisation and introduced the 
country into modernity. The specific articulation of tradition and modernity 
has been termed ‘paternalistic capitalism’. If by 1960 Congo was the 
second industrialsied country of the African subcontinent after South 
Africa it did so thanks to the efforts of many but largely based on coercion 
and not internalised by most of the Africans who had to work and perform in 
one world and live in another. This dual system visialised by the opposition 
european ‘ville’ and indegenuous ‘cité’, black and white, modern and money 
economy versus use value production, etc. Hence modernity – state, money, 
wage labor , christianity - was superficially introduced and with few strong 
roots in traditonal society. At independence there were only 18 universitary 
graduates representing a very small base for the governance of a huge, 
resource-rich country.16 17
  The post-independence period has been very heavily influenced by the 
international environment of cold-war rivalry. The first five year period  of 
multi partyism characterised by a struggle of the african elites for state 
power further stimulated by the old metropole. Indeed Belgian economic 
interests tried to divide the country in order to separate and control better the 
copper rich province. These tendencies led to a chaotic environment. The 
threat of communism led the so-called triad (US, France and Belgium) in 
Congo to adapt a counter revolutionary strategy. This was  not only the case 
in Congo but also in the two other key peripheral countries (Brazil and 
Indonesia). Revolutionary and elected regimes/persons were either 
elimina-ted (Lumumba in Congo) or neutralised (Goulart in Brasil) and 
replaced by military regimes under the auspicies of the West. The lack of 
internal legitimacy was compensated by the western support and  access to 
international money. Development paths of these key peripheral countries 
diverged since then. If all patron and clients of these regimes enriched 
themselves fabulously (The military colonels in Brazil , Mobutu in Congo/
Zaire and Suharto in Indonesia) and if inequality was on the rise in all of 
these contries they did so in a different manner. The state apparatus and 
real investments rose in Brazil and Indonesia where Congo/Zaire  has been 
characterised after a brief period of apparent prosperity (1965-1974) by 
economic regress and state collapse. These divergent paths can only be 
explained by a different ‘warp and weft’ of a different response of strategy to 
the same international environment, finally leading  to the first international 
african war. 
 
3.2     Explaining the collapsed state and economic regress   
    Table 1 shows the postindependent record of economic growth 
and the income per capita. A first period up to 1974 was characterised by 
growth and a lot of new investment by competing international economic 
interests eager to exploit the mineral rich country. Playing on that rivalry, 
president Mobutu attracted in that period a lot of foreign capital and nation-
lised the Belgian Union Minière that became Gécamines. This company 
called the ‘mother’ and ‘the father’ of all inhabitants of the Katanga province 
produced up to 500.000 tonnes of copper a year in 1974 , represented 50 % 
of all exports and financed the state up to 75 % of all state revenue. 
Beginning of the nineties , allthough african cadres were multiplied by ten, 
the production dropped to a dismal level of 30000 tons because of lack of 
spare parts, reinvestment and maintenance. Although the bankruptcy of the 
state mining company was somewhat compensated by the rise of diamond 
production in the eighties and the nineties, it was not able to finance the state 
because diamond production and exports are much more dificult to control 
and can be informalised from the digger to the exporter. The african elite 
confusing property with production,  underestimated the problems of organi-
sation, production and management and used these resources in a predatory 
way. The consequences can be read from the disastrous record of economic 
regression.18 19
Table 1: GDP growth rate and income per capita in 

















  That the formal sector and modernity in terms of wages or formal em-
ployment can be derived from the fact that these wages became insignificant 
after 40 years of independence . They were however still  important as social 
status and for the access to certain education,  health and transport facilities. 
(table 2) 
Table 2  Wages and formal employment




  If wages become insignificant , social security does not exist and retreat 
into usevalue production impossible for urbanised people, how can one sur-
vive? What kind of popular strategy can one invent? The informalisation of 
society. 
Chart 4 depicts what has happened.
Source: BANQUE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE, condensé de statistiques,  différents n°, Kinshasa, 2000-5/2001, 18 19
Accumulation
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  As can be seen from the growth figures in table 1 and from some data in 
table 3 the main period of steepest decline was however situated in the nine-
ties and thus in the post cold-war era. 
Table 3 A few other economic indicators
units 1980 1999
Population Millions inh. 27 50
Domestic Product Millions US$ 14922 5200
Domestic  Product In % of 1980 100 35
Exports In mio$ 2507 1050
Imports In mio $ 1117 540
Copper In 1000 tonnes 468 (in year 1988) 35
Cement  In 1000 tonnes 485(in year 1988) 149
Diamond  In 1000 carat 18163 (in  1988) 26084
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators en Lukusa, CEDAF, 1999
  President Mobutu tried to cling to power after he was sacked by the west. 
Since he had never had an incentive to finance his voracious appetite for os-
tentatious wealth out of increased production that had completely collapsed, 
there was litle room for manoeuvre. Since formal production could not be 
taxed anymore he used the moneypress as a last means. The printing of “real/
false” money was so massive that by 1993 a hyperinflation of 32000% was 
the result, thereby taxing the poorest hardest, since those masses who had 
too little could not flee in diamond or dollars. That chaotic period led also to 
the impossibility of financing an army. Soldiers had to fend for themselves, 
meaning that they were ‘taxing’ every lorry or had to find clients in order 
to sell their security services. Zaire had become by 1997 a giant on clay 
feet and any exterior or interior enemy could wage a war without great risk. 
Since the east of Zaire/Congo was not military controlled it was a territory 
where; rwandan refugees  fleeing the new tutsi regime in Kigali found a safe 
haven, rebel groups fighting Ugandan, Rwandese and Burundese regimes 
found an easy retreat area. But  the region was attractive for other reasons. 
Fertile and abundant land was in contrast with the very densely populated 
areas of the neighbouring countries Rwanda and Burundi. Moreover the 
region harbored (new) mineral wealth (diamond, gold, coltane ).20 21
3.3    The second scramble for Africa’s ressources or plunder of  
    Africa by africans ? 
    In 1997 armed opposition found easy and direct military support 
in Rwanda and Uganda to overthrew the Mobutu regime. A selfpronounced 
political heir of Patrice Lumumba, Laurent Désiré Kabila with a long stand-
ing record of armed opposition and dubious economic activity, was leading 
the military campaign and entered triumphantly the capital Kinshasa in may 
1997. His army was however controlled by Rwandese officers and when he 
tried to recover his autonomy and sent them home a second war was started 
in august 1998 again by so-called internal opposition opposing the dictatorial 
regime of the new president. Rwanda and Uganda denied first their invasion 
but had to admit afterwards when their massive involvment became too ob-
vious. Meanwhile Kabila had been able to mobilize Angolan and Zimbabwe-
an military support thereby dividing the country. The western and southern 
part was controlled by the government and his allies (Zimbambwe, Angola, 
Namibia) whereas the rebels controlled by Uganda and Rwanda dominated  
the north and the east of the country.
  Officially Uganda and Rwanda justified their intervention, stressing the 
need to secure their borders. However these  countries defend their borders 
by invading a neighbouring country and occupying a zone more than 1000 
kilometers away from their borders. Other motives and a hidden agenda is 
therefore suspected. First expansion of territory is a possible motive but that 
seems difficult because the invading forces are seen as such confronting a 
strong national feeling. Moreover there is a n international consensus that 
borders ,although artificially constructed in Africa,  must not be questioned 
because this would generate a domino efect of violence and war. Another 
more probable and hidden motive is that a military-commercial class is using 
the war as a means to enrich themselves. And since a war is by essence a 
period where activities and actions are not transparent and kept silent, it is 
an exceptional opportunity for predation. Thus plunder at the terrible social 
cost for the population, seems to be the underlying drive for the continuation 
of the war. Another factor pointing in the same direction is the fact that the 
invading ugandan and rwandan armies were fighting each other august 1999 
for the control of Kisangani, Congos third city who has become the second 
centre for diamond and gold finds and trade. 
Of course plunder of the mineral resources existed before the war as can be 
read from table 4. 22 23
Table 4: Trade Balance of DRCongo and fraudulous exports of 
diamond (in mio.USD)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports 1.562 1.546 1.448 1.442 749 685
official exp of dia-
mants (1)
331 347 341 399 237 200
Fraudulous exp.of 
diamant 
400 417 411 480 284 239
Exp.diamant/exp 
en %
47% 49% 51% 60% 69% 64%
Imports 870 1.089 769 1.102 568 596
Solde  692 457 697 320 180 89
  This table shows that the Zairian /Congolese state was already  weakened 
in the nineties. Diamond smuggling accounted for was estimated by the na-
tional bank as high as the official exports. We have shown elswhere that this 
is a low estimate. Diamonds from congolese origin entering Antwerp are al-
ready twice as important as the legal diamond export from Congo. What the 
table doesn’t show is that there is not a very comprehensive control in Congo 
since high ranking officials control often the illegal circuits of diamond 
smuggling. This is an example of what Bayart calls the “rhizome state”.
  
  There is the official state and then an invisible one, often circumventing 
the laws of the official state. This criminalisation of the state did not start 
with the invasion of Uganda and Rwanda. But there are a few differences. 
First as can be seen from table 4 , during the war years 99 and 2000 diamond 
production and smuggling went down as reported by the national bank. 
Since the occupied territories do not report their exports it means that the 
plunder went on but to the benefit of anoteher militaro-commercial group. 
Second the ruthlessness of the occupation can be seen from table 5. Indeed 
not only are the benefits of the plunder going to the Rwandan-Ugandan 
military and commercial class but the scale of plunder has been increased 
significantly. 
  The plunder by these two neighbouring countries is exceeding the total 
revenu of the Congolese state. The direct or indirect support from the US and 
the Bretton Woods institutions for these two african allies who have got full 
access to international financial flows is known (They are both elected in the 
HIPC debt reduction exercise). It is also  a testimony that although Africa is 
more and more the affair of the africans and direct military intervention of 
the hegemonic states is less likely, their role in shaping and directing wars 
and violence still present. 
BANQUE  NATIONALE CONGOLAISE, condensé de statistiques, différents numéros, Kinshasa, 2000-5/2001.22 23
Table 5: Mineral exports from Congo plundered by Rwanda and Uganda
In mio. USD RWANDA UGANDA
1999 2000 1999 2000
DIAMANT
Official Exports       0,4      1,8      1,8  1,3
Non declared diamond exports for 
Rwanda and reexports in the case of 
Uganda
40 40 1,8 1,3
GOLD8
Official exportss        0,1        0,1 95,0 89,9
Non declared gold exports*Rwanda and 
reexports Uganda
29 29 95,0 89,9
COLTAN
Offical Exports  24       16,6 13,9 -
Non declared coltan exports* 240 240 13,9 -
Totla declared exports of minerals9 61,2 68,4 438,8 380,5
Total exports declared and non declared 309 309 110,7 91,2
En % of  declared exports. 505% 452% 25% 24%
Total value added of plundered diamond, 
gold and coltane 
238,3 238,1 61,1 45,3
En % PIB10 12,2% 10,4% 1,1% 0,8%
En % dép. militaires11 292% 277% 53% 43%
   
8 we estimate the value of goldex-
ports by multiplying the exports 
by the goldprice as of april  30, 
2001 (8.300 USD/kilo).
9 IMF, Rwanda. Staff report for 
the 2000 article IV consultation 
and requests for the third annual 
arrangement under the poverty 
reduction and growth facility 
and for extension of commitment 
period, Washington, IMF, 12 
December 2000, p.39 ;  IMF, 
Uganda. Staff report for the 2001 
article IV consultation, Second 
review under the third annual 
arrangement under the poverty 
reduction and growth facility and 
request for waiver of performance 
criteria, Washington, IMF, 19 
January 2000, p.43.
10 IMF, Uganda. Staff report for 
the..., op. cit., 12 March 2001, 
p.8, 37.
11 IMF, Uganda. Staff report for 
the..., op. cit., 12 March 2001, 
p.8, 40.24
    Conclusion: violence and regress  
    The main theses on Africa’s changing role in the world-system 
and the increasing risk of fragmentation, violence and regress can be sum-
marised as follows :
•  We are confronted with collapsing states and economic regress in former  
  key peripheral countries.
•  This multifacetted crisis is woven out of the warp and weft of internal  
  and external (f)actors. In other words the collapse of state and economy  
  is due to the action of the economy of affection intertwined with the
  absence of incentives by the political african elites – because of easy-  
  money access through geopolitical rivalry in the coldwar era – to create  
  sustainable economic surpluses.
•  The change in the international environment in the post cold war era has  
  led to the adaption of the Washington consensus but triggered off a new  
  strategy of extraversion by african elites. This new strategy was in some  
  rare cases a transition to democracy, in  many other countries led to 
  violence, further regress and war.
RD Congo is exemplary as illustration for these three theses.24Institute of Development Policy and Management Centre for the study of de great lakes region of Africa